‘Reeling in’ fish fraud : identifying the stage where seafood mislabelling occurs in Canada’s supply chain and solving it : European success adapted to Canada

Abstract

In Canada, there exists an epidemic of seafood fraud ad counteracting this requires an understanding of which actors are creating this issue. To do this, I created a model and used variables, including likelihood to be caught, the costs of being caught both in terms of reputational costs and fines levied by the government, to determine which stage of the supply chain has the greatest incentive. I found that various stages had some incentive however, the value-add and processing stage had the greatest benefit and lowest likelihood of being caught. I then put forward some policy suggestions, based off Europe’s success in addressing fraud, and adapted them to the Canadian situation. The literature and information in this area has proven there are ways of combatting seafood fraud in Canada and this paper hopes to over a meaningful way of addressing the perpetrators of it and an efficient solution to discouraging it.