|dc.description.abstract||The purpose of this study was to investigate whether becoming member of the Maritime Anti-Corruption Network (MACN) comes with a monetary penalty in terms of longer waiting times for entering the Suez Canal. This thesis di˙ers from earlier empirical studies on corruption by utilising data derived from Automatic Identification System (AIS) enabling a more objective measurement of corruption, compared to the more common measurement of perception. In addition, this is also one of the first studies to investigate how both technical and human factors a˙ects waiting time in the Suez Canal.
The data set consist various data sources, including data derived from AIS, from Clarksons World Fleet Register (WFR) and from MACN, combined into a detailed vessel-level panel data set covering the Suez Canal from 2012 to 2016. Unobserved e˙ect models, such as random and fixed e˙ects models, are used to investigate whether there is a causal relationship between membership status and waiting time. Heterogeneity analysis and several robustness test are performed to verify the results.
This thesis finds no evidence of MACN membership a˙ecting the waiting time to enter the Suez Canal. While there are many reasons that could explain the lack of significant e˙ect, this thesis emphasises how the lack of significant e˙ects stems from the fact that the MACN "say no"-campaign was not introduced before 2015. Thus, the e˙ect of membership might not significantly a˙ect the outcome of interest in the period studied by this thesis. Future research should therefore collect more detailed data, and data for a longer period of time, in order to understand if waiting times are longer for companies that become members of MACN.
The policy relevance of understanding how anti-corruption tools might a˙ect (shipping) economics can therefore hardly be underestimated, but no clear answer has yet emerged from the literature.||nb_NO