An exploratory study of economic incentives and corporate tax evasion : how can economic incentives to self-report reduce corporate tax evasion in Norway?

Abstract

The thesis aims to answer how economic incentives to self-report can reduce corporate tax evasion in Norway. To do so, I make a theoretical and empirical comparison, using a literature review and interviews with Skatteetaten and Økokrim. In addition, I examine corporate instruments to prevent corporate tax evasion in the first place. The findings suggest that tax amnesties, or leniency programs, are inadequate to induce corporations to self-report tax evasion. Instead, I argue that whistleblowing programs and individual bounties can induce employees within noncompliant companies to self-report the misconduct. The use of rewards is untraditional in Norway and it would require substantial efforts to achieve a culture in favour of whistleblowers, which could effectively combat corporate tax evasion. Key words: self-report, leniency programs, tax amnesty, corporate tax evasion, whistleblowing, corporate and individual liability, rewards, corporate prevention and policing.