dc.description.abstract | This thesis examines the short- and long-term performance of firms issuing equity
privately on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE). By investigating an unexamined time
period, this thesis adds new evidence to the existing literature of private
placements. Contrary to former research, our results show a statistically significant
negative stock price reaction to a private placement announcement. Previous
literature explains the stock price reaction to a private placement announcement
with the monitoring-, certification- or the management entrenchment hypothesis.
These theories seem to be less relevant for justifying the stock price behavior of
firms utilizing private placements on the OSE. It appears that our results can be
better explained by how the issuer intends to use the raised proceeds. Furthermore,
the long-term analysis reinforces the findings of Eckbo and Norli (2004) that
(most) private placement firms on the OSE achieve normal returns over a 3-year
holding period. The exception to this is firms in breach of covenants or in the need
of financial restructuring where abnormally negative returns are observed in the
long-run. The totality of our empirical findings indicates that the equal treatment
principle on the OSE is satisfied and that the pervasive use of board authorizations
cannot necessarily be considered a ´bad dealµ for existing shareholders. | en_US |