| dc.description.abstract | Norwegian legislation prevents banks from sharing speci c kinds of information that might
have been used to better predict the creditworthiness of their customers. We construct a
simple market participation model to describe how good methods of estimating default risk
is likely to result in increased customer surplus and more fair, e ective credit allocation.
We use a game theory-framework to describe why these gains can only be realized if these
estimations can be shared with other banks, as the customer will otherwise be able to reset
his or her risk assessment by switching banks. We propose and evaluate three possible
implementations, and remark that our analysis suggests that the full gains of improved risk
assessment that is introduced with CRD IV and Basel III cannot necessarily be realized
without changes in the banks ability to share information about their customers.
Our results are sensitive to assumptions about price competition between banks, ratio-
nality of customers and distribution of default probabilities. | nb_NO |
