An alternative model of political agency
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- Master Thesis 
This paper develops an alternative political agency model. We add uncertainty related to the payoff of electing the challenger and then we model effort by the politicians as an investment in a public good that will be realized if and only if the incumbent is reelected. We find that uncertainty related to the challenger has an ambiguous effect on the level of investment, but that more uncertainty makes the incumbent less willing to invest when the politicians care about the payoff from the investment. Using this model we then proceed to find that there can exist a level of uncertainty where the incumbent would be willing to invest in a non-electoral system, but the presence of elections make the incumbent unwilling to invest. In this case the voter might be better off without elections. Then we find that the effect of electoral biases on the level of investment is depending on the level of uncertainty. Longer terms of office can increase the incentives to invest in the public good.