Now showing items 21-36 of 36

    • Markets for public and private health care : redistribution arguments for a mixed system 

      Schroyen, Fred; Marchand, Maurice (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2001-04)
      Should health care provision be public, private, or both? We look at this question in a setting where people differ in their earnings capacity and express an inelastic demand for health care. We assume that illness reduces ...
    • Multidimensional screening in a monopolistic insurance market 

      Olivella, Pau; Schroyen, Fred (Discussion Papers;19/2011, Working paper, 2011-11)
      In this paper, we consider a population of individuals who differ in two dimensions: their risk type (expected loss) and their risk aversion. We solve for the profit maximizing menu of contracts that a monopolistic insurer ...
    • Multidimensional screening in a monopolistic insurance market: proofs 

      Olivella, Pau; Schroyen, Fred (Discussion Papers;21/2011, Working paper, 2011-11)
      This technical paper contains the proofs of all lemmata, propo- sitions and other statements made in the paper Multidimensional screening in a monopolistic insurance market.
    • Operational expressions for the marginal cost of indirect taxation when merit arguments matter 

      Schroyen, Fred (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2005-02)
      Marginal indirect tax reform analysis evaluates for each commodity (group) the marginal welfare cost (MC) of increasing government revenue with 1 Euro by raising the indirect tax rate on that commodity. In this paper, ...
    • Operational expressions for the marginal cost of indirect taxation when merit arguments matter 

      Schroyen, Fred (Working paper, Working paper, 2009-02)
      Marginal indirect tax reform analysis evaluates for each commodity (group) the marginal welfare cost (MC) of increasing government revenue by one Euro by raising the indirect tax rate on that commodity. In this paper, I ...
    • Optimal hospital payment rules under rationing by random waiting. 

      Gravelle, Hugh; Schroyen, Fred (SAM;8/2016, Working paper, 2016-05-19)
      We derive optimal rules for paying hospitals in a public health care system in which providers can choose quality and random patient demand is rationed by waiting time. Since waiting time imposes real costs on patients ...
    • Pricing of an interruptible service with financial compensation and rational expectations 

      Schroyen, Fred; Oyenuga, Adekola Oludolapo (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2008-08)
      This paper proposes a pricing framework that combines the occurrence of supply interruptions with financial compensations. Consumers post ex ante demands for a designated period. These demands are met if ex post supply ...
    • Redistributive taxation and the household : the case of individual filings 

      Schroyen, Fred (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2002-01)
      In this paper I look at the tax treatment of households under individual filings and characterise the efficiency properties of an income tax schedule that redistributes from rich to poor households. Because tax liabilities ...
    • Reference dependent risk preferences and insurance Demand 

      Toney, George Philip (Master thesis, 2020)
      This thesis explores insurance decisions with respect to modest risks. Bernoulli’s expected utility theory is compared to a model where utility depends on both final wealth and changes in wealth relative to some reference ...
    • Sticks and carrots for the alleviation of long-term poverty 

      Schroyen, Fred; Torsvik, Gaute (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2001-12)
      Work requirements can make it easier to screen the poor from the nonpoor. They can also affect future poverty by changing the poors’ incentive to invest in their income capacity. The novelty of our study is the focus ...
    • The impact of international tax information exchange agreements on the use of tax amnesty: evidence from Norway 

      Andersson, Jonas; Schroyen, Fred; Torsvik, Gaute (DP SAM;16/2019, Working paper, 2019-09)
      In this paper we develop a model for tax amnesty applications in a multi-period setting. One key insight from the model is that applying for amnesty becomes more attractive at the moment when stricter enforcement is ...
    • The impact of international tax information exchange agreements on the use of tax amnesty: evidence from Norway 

      Andersson, Jonas; Schroyen, Fred; Torsvik, Gaute (Discussion paper;12/19, Working paper, 2019-10-04)
      In this paper we develop a model for tax amnesty applications in a multi-period setting. One key insight from the model is that applying for amnesty becomes more attractive at the moment when stricter enforcement is ...
    • The power of money : wealth effects in contests 

      Schroyen, Fred; Treich, Nicolas (Discussion Papers;13/2013, Working paper, 2013-06)
      Two wealth effects typically arise in any contest: i) wealth decreases the marginal cost of effort, but also ii) decreases the marginal benefit of winning the contest. In this paper, we introduce three types of strategic ...
    • Utility analysis, luxuries and risk : a critical comment 

      Schroyen, Fred (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006-10)
      This note questions the analysis of Diacon (2006) in the June issue of Economics Letters. It points at a misinterpretation and claims that the conclusion—that the presence of luxuries may make people love income gambles ...
    • The values of relative risk aversion and prudence : a context-free interpretation 

      Eeckhoudt, Louis; Etner, Johanna; Schroyen, Fred (Working paper, Working paper, 2009-02)
      In this paper we apply to multiplicative lotteries the idea of preference for “harm disaggregation” that was used for additive lotteries in order to interpret the signs of successive derivatives of a utility function. In ...
    • Work requirements and long term poverty 

      Schroyen, Fred; Torsvik, Gaute (Discussion paper, Working paper, 1999)
      We study how work requirements can be used to target transfers to the long term poor. Without commitment, time consistency requires all screening measures to be concentrated in the first phase of the program. We show ...