• Forced board changes : evidence from Norway 

      Nygaard, Knut (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2011-03)
    • Just luck: an experimental study of risk taking and fairness 

      Cappelen, Alexander W.; Konow, James; Sørensen, Erik Ø.; Tungodden, Bertil (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2010-01)
      Choices involving risk significantly affect the distribution of income and wealth in society, but there is probably no more contentious question of justice than how to allocate the gains and losses that inevitably result ...
    • Mapping risk aversion in Norway using hypothetical income gambles 

      Aarbu, Karl Ove; Schroyen, Fred (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2009-08)
      This is the first study that explores the heterogeneity of risk preferences among the Norwegian population. We measure risk aversion as the complement of the maximal relative downside income risk a person is willing to ...
    • Merger simulations with observed diversion ratios 

      Mathiesen, Lars; Nilsen, Øivind Anti; Sørgard, Lars (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2010-10)
      A common approach to merger simulations used in antitrust cases is to calibrate demand from market shares and a few additional parameters. When the products involved in the merger case are differentiated along several ...
    • Mergers and partial ownership 

      Foros, Øystein; Kind, Hans Jarle; Shaffer, Greg (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2010-01)
      In this paper we compare the profitability of a merger to the profitability of a partial ownership arrangement and find that partial ownership arrangements can be more profitable for the acquiring and acquired firm because ...
    • Negotiation under possible third party settlement 

      Birkeland, Sigbjørn (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2011-03)
    • Price-dependent profit-sharing as a channel coordination device 

      Foros, Øystein; Hagen, Kåre Petter; Kind, Hans Jarle (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2009-07)
      We show how an upstream firm by using a price-dependent profit-sharing rule can prevent destructive competition between downstream firms that produce relatively close substitutes. With this rule the upstream firm induces ...