• Hospital competition with soft budgets 

      Brekke, Kurt Richard; Siciliani, Luigi; Straume, Odd Rune (Discussion paper;6/2012, Working paper, 2012-03)
      We study the incentives for hospitals to provide quality and expend cost-reducing effort when their budgets are soft, i.e., the payer may cover deficits or confiscate surpluses. The basic set up is a Hotelling model with ...
    • Hospital mergers with regulated prices 

      Brekke, Kurt Richard; Siciliani, Luigi; Straume, Odd Rune (Discussion paper;21/2014, Working paper, 2014-05)
      We study the effects of a hospital merger using a spatial competition framework with semialtruistic hospitals that invest in quality and expend cost-containment effort facing regulated prices. We find that the merging ...