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Person-affecting paretian egalitarianism with variable population size

Tungodden, Bertil; Vallentyne, Peter
Working paper
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URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/162696
Date
2005-08
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  • Discussion papers (SAM) [640]
Abstract
Where there is a fixed population (i.e., who exists does not depend on what choice an agent

makes), the deontic version of anonymous Paretian egalitarianism holds that an option is just if

and only if (1) it is anonymously Pareto optimal (i.e. , no feasible alternative has a permutation

that is Pareto superior), and (2) it is no less equal than any other anonymously Pareto optimal

option. We shall develop and discuss a version of this approach for the variable population case

(i.e., where who exists does depend on what choice an agent makes). More specifically, we shall

develop and discuss it in the context of a person -affecting framework—in which an option is just if and only if it wrongs no one according to certain plausible conditions on wrongi.
Publisher
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics
Series
Discussion paper
2005:13

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