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Samaritan agents? : on the delegation of aid policy

Hagen, Rune Jansen
Working paper
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URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/162826
Date
2003
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  • Discussion papers (SAM) [675]
Abstract
Should a donor delegate the responsibility for allocating its aid budget

to a less inequality-averse agent to alleviate the consequences of the

Samaritan’s Dilemma it is facing? I show that when aid impact differs

across recipients the optimal type of agent depends on whether or not

committing to a greater share for countries where the productivity of aid

is low raises the combined domestic incomes of recipients. This is the

case for donors too concerned with efficiency ex post. They therefore delegate

the decision on the discretionary aid allocation rule to agents more sensitive to distributional issues than themselves.
Description
Updated October 2004
Publisher
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics
Series
Discussion paper
2003:22

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