Samaritan agents? : on the delegation of aid policy
Working paper
Permanent lenke
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/162826Utgivelsesdato
2003Metadata
Vis full innførselSamlinger
- Discussion papers (SAM) [647]
Sammendrag
Should a donor delegate the responsibility for allocating its aid budget
to a less inequality-averse agent to alleviate the consequences of the
Samaritan’s Dilemma it is facing? I show that when aid impact differs
across recipients the optimal type of agent depends on whether or not
committing to a greater share for countries where the productivity of aid
is low raises the combined domestic incomes of recipients. This is the
case for donors too concerned with efficiency ex post. They therefore delegate
the decision on the discretionary aid allocation rule to agents more sensitive to distributional issues than themselves.
Beskrivelse
Updated October 2004
Utgiver
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of EconomicsSerie
Discussion paper2003:22