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dc.contributor.authorHagen, Kåre Petter
dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarle
dc.contributor.authorSannarnes, Jan Gaute
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-08T07:04:43Z
dc.date.available2006-08-08T07:04:43Z
dc.date.issued2004-10
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/162836
dc.description.abstractThis paper addresses the issue of national optimal tariffs for transportation of natural gas in a setting where national gas production in its entirety is exported to end-user markets abroad. In a situation where the transportation network is owned altogether by a vertically integrated national gas producer, it is shown that the optimal tariff depends on the ownership structure in the integrated transportation company as well as in the non-facility based gas company. There are two reasons why it is possibly optimal with a mark-up on marginal transportation costs. First, there is a premium on public revenue if domestic taxation is distorting. Second, with incomplete national taxation of rents from the gas sector, the transportation tariffs can serve as a second best way of appropriating rents accruing to foreigners. In a situation where the network is run as a separate entity subject to a rate of return regulation, it will be optimal to discriminate the tariffs between shippers for the usual Ramseyean reasons.en
dc.format.extent233578 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2004:27en
dc.subjectregulationen
dc.subjecttransport networken
dc.subjectEU’s gas market directiveen
dc.titleNetwork ownership and optimal tariffs for natural gas transporten
dc.typeWorking paperen


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