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Tacit collusion and international commodity taxation

Haufler, Andreas; Schjelderup, Guttorm
Working paper
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URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/162858
Date
2003-01
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  • Discussion papers (SAM) [578]
Abstract
The paper employs a model of dynamic price competition to study how

international commodity taxation affects the stability of collusive agreements

when producers in an international duopoly agree not to export into each

other’s home market. We consider both the choice of international tax principle

and the harmonization of tax rates and differentiate between a setting

where production costs differ between countries, and a setting where exogenous

tax rate differentials are the only asymmetry. The conclusions derived

from this model differ strongly from those obtained under the assumption of competitive product markets.
Publisher
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics
Series
Discussion paper
2003:2

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