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Fiscal corruption : a vice or a virtue?

Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge; Tungodden, Bertil
Working paper
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dp2002-14.pdf (52.38Kb)
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http://hdl.handle.net/11250/162934
Utgivelsesdato
2002-07
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  • Discussion papers (SAM) [607]
Sammendrag
Recent literature on tax administration in poor countries suggests there are virtues of allowing fiscal

corruption. By strengthening the bargaining power of corrupt tax officers, it is argued that tax evasion

may be reduced and tax revenues increased. But does such an intriguing paradox justify policies that

stimulate corruption? Our answer is no, and this note puts forward three arguments to support our

view. First, while an increase in corruption may raise revenues in the short run, in general the

opposite will be the case in the longer run. Second, the instrumental value of reducing corruption goes

far beyond its effects on tax evasion and tax revenues. Accepting corruption as a policy strategy to

increase tax revenues may undermine values of democracy and good governance. Third, eliminating

corruption should be considered an end in itself. Thus, contrary to recent suggestions on incentive

reforms in tax administration, the reasonable starting point for policy debates in this area should still be

that an increase in fiscal corruption is not an appropriate instrument for raising tax revenues. Sustained

development cannot grow from an institutional framework that fosters corruption and extra-legal tax enforcement.
Utgiver
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics
Serie
Discussion paper
2002:14

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