• norsk
    • English
  • norsk 
    • norsk
    • English
  • Logg inn
Vis innførsel 
  •   Hjem
  • Norges Handelshøyskole
  • Department of Economics
  • Discussion papers (SAM)
  • Vis innførsel
  •   Hjem
  • Norges Handelshøyskole
  • Department of Economics
  • Discussion papers (SAM)
  • Vis innførsel
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Losers, winners and prisoner's dilemma in international subsidy wars

Pires, Armando José Garcia
Working paper
Thumbnail
Åpne
dp2006-33.pdf (248.3Kb)
Permanent lenke
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163076
Utgivelsesdato
2006-10
Metadata
Vis full innførsel
Samlinger
  • Discussion papers (SAM) [638]
Sammendrag
Two central results in the strategic trade literature are that governments shall support winners and that there is a policy prisoner dilemma in international subsidy wars (i.e.: countries have incentives to support local firms but they would be better off by cooperating to not intervene). We show that exactly the contrary holds when asymmetries between firms are endogenous. Specifically, the incentives to support are bigger for loser firms given that intervention can aim at making them winners (competitiveness shifting effects). As a result the countries that host less competitive firms always prefer intervention. We illustrate this with the Airbus-Boeing case.
Utgiver
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics
Serie
Discussion paper
2006:33

Kontakt oss | Gi tilbakemelding

Personvernerklæring
DSpace software copyright © 2002-2019  DuraSpace

Levert av  Unit
 

 

Bla i

Hele arkivetDelarkiv og samlingerUtgivelsesdatoForfattereTitlerEmneordDokumenttyperTidsskrifterDenne samlingenUtgivelsesdatoForfattereTitlerEmneordDokumenttyperTidsskrifter

Min side

Logg inn

Statistikk

Besøksstatistikk

Kontakt oss | Gi tilbakemelding

Personvernerklæring
DSpace software copyright © 2002-2019  DuraSpace

Levert av  Unit