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The effects of different strategic variables in non-cooperative fisheries games

Ekerhovd, Nils-Arne
Working paper
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URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163078
Date
2006-10
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  • Discussion papers (SAM) [586]
Abstract
In this paper we use stock size, harvest quantity and fishing effort,

respectively, as strategic variables. We model a two agent (nations)

non-cooperative fishery game, where the agents harvest a common

fish stock. The planning horizon is infinite. The model is solved

successively using one instrument at a time as the strategic variable

in the game. The net present values of fishing and the escapement

stock level from the three different models are compared with each

other to show how the choice of variables affects the results. The

choice of strategic variable is not a trivial one, as the results are shown

to be sensitive to the discounting, the stock rate of growth, and the

assumptions about the distribution of the fish in response to being harvested.
Publisher
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics
Series
Discussion paper
2006:35

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