The effects of different strategic variables in non-cooperative fisheries games
Working paper
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http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163078Utgivelsesdato
2006-10Metadata
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Sammendrag
In this paper we use stock size, harvest quantity and fishing effort,
respectively, as strategic variables. We model a two agent (nations)
non-cooperative fishery game, where the agents harvest a common
fish stock. The planning horizon is infinite. The model is solved
successively using one instrument at a time as the strategic variable
in the game. The net present values of fishing and the escapement
stock level from the three different models are compared with each
other to show how the choice of variables affects the results. The
choice of strategic variable is not a trivial one, as the results are shown
to be sensitive to the discounting, the stock rate of growth, and the
assumptions about the distribution of the fish in response to being harvested.
Utgiver
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of EconomicsSerie
Discussion paper2006:35