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Pay and performance in a call centre : principals and agents or principally angels?

Aarbu, Karl Ove; Torsvik, Gaute
Working paper
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URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163118
Date
2007-11
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  • Discussion papers (SAM) [578]
Abstract
We use data from a pay reform in an insurance company to contrast

different theories of work motivations. The management installed

performance pay to boost sales in the customer service centre of the

company. The reform was successful. The bonus scheme gave the operators

both self-regarding and other-regarding incentives to increase

sales. The increase in sales does therefore not in itself help us identify

the underlying motivation of the workers. However, when we examine

the evolution of the design and impact of the scheme, we conclude

that the standard principal-agent model best explains the patterns in

our data.
Publisher
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics
Series
Discussion paper
2007:33

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