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dc.contributor.authorJensen, Sissel
dc.contributor.authorKvaløy, Ola
dc.contributor.authorOlsen, Trond E.
dc.contributor.authorSørgard, Lars
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-14T12:16:25Z
dc.date.available2013-03-14T12:16:25Z
dc.date.issued2013-02
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163336
dc.description.abstractThe economics of crime and punishment postulates that higher punishment leads to lower crime levels, or less severe crime. It is however hard to get empirical support for this intuitive relationship. This paper offers a model that contributes to explain why this is the case. We show that if criminals can spend resources to reduce the probability of being detected, then a higher general punishment level can increase the crime level. In the context of antitrust enforcement, it is shown that competition authorities who attempt to ght cartels by means of tougher sanctions for all offenders may actually lead cartels to increase their overcharge when leniency programs are in place.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics, Department of Economicsno_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper;4/2013
dc.subjectantitrust enforcementno_NO
dc.subjectleniency programsno_NO
dc.subjecteconomics of crimeno_NO
dc.titleCrime and punishment : when tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overchargeno_NO
dc.typeWorking paperno_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212no_NO


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