• norsk
    • English
  • norsk 
    • norsk
    • English
  • Logg inn
Vis innførsel 
  •   Hjem
  • Norges Handelshøyskole
  • Department of Economics
  • Discussion papers (SAM)
  • Vis innførsel
  •   Hjem
  • Norges Handelshøyskole
  • Department of Economics
  • Discussion papers (SAM)
  • Vis innførsel
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Paying for staying : managerial contracts and the retention motive

Ellingsen, Tore; Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard
Working paper
Thumbnail
Åpne
SAM0812.pdf (341.4Kb)
Permanent lenke
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163346
Utgivelsesdato
2012-03
Metadata
Vis full innførsel
Samlinger
  • Discussion papers (SAM) [586]
Sammendrag
Talented managers may leave the firm in order to work elsewhere. Focusing on the

portability of managers' resources, we develop a model in which managerial compensation

is designed to prevent inefficient departure. The model rationalizes the widespread use of

fl at salaries in combination with performance-vesting stock options and is consistent with

observed differences in compensation contracts across individuals, firms, industries, and

countries.
Utgiver
Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics
Serie
Discussion paper;8/2012

Kontakt oss | Gi tilbakemelding

Personvernerklæring
DSpace software copyright © 2002-2019  DuraSpace

Levert av  Unit
 

 

Bla i

Hele arkivetDelarkiv og samlingerUtgivelsesdatoForfattereTitlerEmneordDokumenttyperTidsskrifterDenne samlingenUtgivelsesdatoForfattereTitlerEmneordDokumenttyperTidsskrifter

Min side

Logg inn

Statistikk

Besøksstatistikk

Kontakt oss | Gi tilbakemelding

Personvernerklæring
DSpace software copyright © 2002-2019  DuraSpace

Levert av  Unit