dc.contributor.author | Brekke, Kurt Richard | |
dc.contributor.author | Siciliani, Luigi | |
dc.contributor.author | Straume, Odd Rune | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-03-12T13:48:30Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-03-12T13:48:30Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2012-03 | |
dc.identifier.isbn | 0804-6824 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163428 | |
dc.description.abstract | We study the effect of competition on quality in markets such as health care, long-term
care and education, when providers choose both prices and quality in a setting of spatial
competition. We offer a novel mechanism whereby competition leads to lower quality. This
mechanism relies on two key assumptions, namely that the providers are motivated and riskaverse. Our proposed mechanism can help explain several empirical findings of a negative
effect of competition on quality. | no_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | no_NO |
dc.publisher | Norges handelshøyskole | no_NO |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion paper;9/2012 | |
dc.subject | quality | no_NO |
dc.subject | motivated providers | no_NO |
dc.subject | price competition | no_NO |
dc.subject | risk-averse providers | no_NO |
dc.title | Can competition reduce quality? | no_NO |
dc.type | Working paper | no_NO |
dc.subject.nsi | VDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212 | no_NO |