Browsing Department of Business and Management Science by Subject "relational contracts"
Now showing items 1-5 of 5
-
Asset ownership and relational contracts
(Discussion paper, Working paper, 2002)In a setting where two managers make relationship- and asset-specific investments, the optimal relational contract specifies the same payments that renegotiations would have led to in a spot mode, plus a fixed transfer and ... -
Endogenous verifiability in relational contracting
(Discussion paper, Working paper, 2004-11)We analyze a repeated principal-agent trust game where the principal makes a specific investment by paying the agent up-front, expecting an agreed upon quality level in return. The verifiability of the agent’s action is ... -
Relational Contracts, Multiple Agents, and Correlated Outputs
(Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2019)We analyze relational contracts between a principal and a set of risk-neutral agents whose outputs are correlated. When only the agents’ aggregate output can be observed, a team incentive scheme is shown to be optimal, ... -
Relative performance evaluation, agent hold-up and firm organization
(Discussion paper, Working paper, 2007-07)We analyze a situation where common noise makes compensation based on relative performance evaluation (RPE) desirable, but where the agents' ability to hold-up values ex post obstruct the implementation of optimal RPE ... -
The rise of individual performance pay
(Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006-07)Why does individual performance pay seem to prevail in human-capital-intensive industries where teamwork is so common? We present a model that aims to explain this. In a repeated game model of relational contracting, we ...