Newspapers have an incentive to moderate their profile in order to gain a larger readership and thus higher advertising revenue. We show that this incentive is weakened both if readers are ad-haters and if they are ad-lovers.

We start out reviewing the justification for press subsidies. The social value of journalism can be larger than what the newspapers are able to extract because of knowledge externalities, public good characteristics of ...

We analyze a Hotelling model where consumers either buy one out of two goods (single-purchase) or both (multi-purchase). The firms pricing strategies turn out to be fundamentally different if some consumers multi-purchase ...

In this paper we compare the profitability of a merger between two firms (one firm fully acquires another) and the profitability of a partial ownership arrangement between the same two firms in which the acquiring firm ...

Newspapers are two-sided platforms that sell their product both to readers and advertisers. Media firms in general, and newspapers in particular, are considered important providers of information, culture and language in ...

In a Hotelling duopoly model, we introduce quality that is more appreciated by closer consumers. Then higher common quality raises equilibrium prices, in contrast to the standard neutrality result. Furthermore, we allow ...

Two-sided platform firms serve distinct customer groups that are connected through interdependent demand, and include major businesses such as the media industry, banking, and the software industry. A well known textbook ...