• Balanced scorecards: a relational contract approach 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper;3/20, Working paper, 2020-05-08)
      Reward systems based on balanced scorecards typically connect pay to an index, i.e. a weighted sum of multiple performance measures. However, there is no formal incentive model that actually describe this kind of index ...
    • Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement 

      Miller, David; Olsen, Trond E.; Watson, Joel (Discussion paper;8/18, Working paper, 2018-05-18)
      We study relational contracting and renegotiation in environments with external enforcement of long-term contractual arrangements. An external, long-term contract governs the stage games the contracting parties will play ...
    • Relational Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement 

      Chi, Chang Koo; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper;6/18, Working paper, 2018-04-30)
      This paper analyzes relational contracts under moral hazard. We first show that if the available information (signal) about effort satisfies a generalized monotone likelihood ratio property, then irrespective of whether ...
    • Relational incentive contracts for teams of multitasking agents 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper;10/23, Working paper, 2023-06-30)
      We analyze optimal relational contracts for a group (team) of multitasking agents with hidden actions. Contracts are based on noisy signals that may be correlated across agents and between tasks. The optimal contract defines ...
    • Teams in Relational Contracts 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper;23/16, Working paper, 2016-12-16)
      We analyze relational contracting between a principal and a team of agents where only aggregate output is observable. We deduce optimal team incentive contracts under di¤erent set of assumptions, and show that the principal ...