• Advertising and Newspaper Differentiation: On the Role of Readers’ Advertising Taste 

      Kind, Hans Jarle; Koethenbuerger, Marko; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2007-01)
      Newspapers have an incentive to moderate their profile in order to gain a larger readership and thus higher advertising revenue. We show that this incentive is weakened both if readers are ad-haters and if they are ad-lovers.
    • An anticipative linear filtering equation 

      Aase, Knut K.; Bjuland, Terje; Øksendal, Bernt (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2010-08)
    • Continuous harvesting costs in sole-owner fisheries with increasing marginal returns 

      Maroto, Jose M.; Moran, Manuel; Sandal, Leif Kristoffer; Steinshamn, Stein Ivar (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2009-09)
      We develop a bioeconomic model to analyze a sole-owner fishery with fixed costs as well as a continuous cost function for the generalized Cobb-Douglas production function with increasing marginal returns to effort level. ...
    • Continuous monitoring : look before you leap 

      Lindset, Snorre; Persson, Svein-Arne (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2008-03)
      We present a model for pricing credit risk protection for a limited liability non-life insurance company. The protection is typically provided by a guaranty fund. In the case of continuous monitoring, i.e., where the market ...
    • A convolution estimator for the density of nonlinear regression observations 

      Støve, Bård; Tjøstheim, Dag (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2007-11)
      The problem of estimating an unknown density function has been widely studied. In this paper we present a convolution estimator for the density of the responses in a nonlinear regression model. The rate of convergence for ...
    • Cooperation in knowledge-intensive firms 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2007-07)
      The extent to which a knowledge-intensive firm should induce cooperation between its employees is analyzed in a model of relational contracting between a firm (principal) and its employees (two agents). The agents can ...
    • Credit spreads and incomplete information 

      Lindset, Snorre; Lund, Arne-Christian; Persson, Svein-Arne (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2008-03)
      A new model is presented which produces credit spreads that do not converge to zero for short maturities. Our set-up includes incomplete, i.e., delayed and asymmetric information. When the financial market observes the ...
    • The defeasance of control rights 

      Bienz, Carsten; Fluck, Zsuzsanna; Faure-Grimaud, Antoine (Discussion pape, Working paper, 2011-01)
    • Do all-equity firms destroy value by holding cash? 

      Kisser, Michael (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2010-12)
      Empirical evidence shows that as of 2006, nearly every fifth large U.S. public corporation was all-equity financed and that the corresponding average cash holding were nearly twice as high as of the average U.S. firm. ...
    • The equity premium and the risk free rate in a production economy : a new perspective 

      Aase, Knut K. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2011-02)
    • Evidence on competitive advantage and superior stock market performance 

      Gjerde, Øystein; Knivsflå, Kjell Henry; Sættem, Frode (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2009-10)
      This article analyzes the value-relevance of industry-based and resource-based competitive advantage in a large sample of firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. We measure competitive advantage by a single variable and ...
    • Evolution of Decision and Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts: An Empirical Analysis 

      Bienz, Carsten; Walz, Uwe (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006-12)
      We analyze the structure and evolution of the allocation of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts by using a sample of 464 contracts between venture capitalists (VC) and portfolio firms from Germany. We ...
    • Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a reinsurance syndicate 

      Aase, Knut K. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2008-07)
      In this paper we consider a reinsurance syndicate, assuming that Pareto optimal allocations exist. Under a continuity assumption on preferences, we show that a competitive equilibrium exists and is unique. Our conditions ...
    • Foreclosure in contests 

      Clark, Derek J.; Foros, Øystein; Sand, Jan Yngve (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2008-12)
      We consider a contest in which one firm is a favourite as it initially has a cost advantage over rivals. Instead of taking the set of rivals as given, we consider the possibility that the favourite transfers the source ...
    • Global warming and international fishery management : does anticipation of the temperature change matter? 

      Liu, Xiaozi; Heino, Mikko (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2010-12)
      This paper investigates the effects of climate-induced rising of ocean temperature on the optimal fishing policies in a two players’ non-cooperative game setting. We compare reactive management, under which the manager ...
    • Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and its Effect on Collusive Behavior 

      Schindler, Dirk; Schjelderup, Guttorm (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2007-01)
      We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may ...
    • Hotelling competition with multi-purchasing 

      Anderson, Simon P.; Foros, Øystein; Kind, Hans Jarle (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2010-12)
      We analyze a Hotelling model where consumers either buy one out of two goods (single-purchase) or both (multi-purchase). The firms pricing strategies turn out to be fundamentally different if some consumers multi-purchase ...
    • Incentive provision when contracting is costly 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2010-08)
      We analyze optimal incentive contracts in a model where the probability of court enforcement is determined by the costs spent on contracting. We show that contract costs matter for incentive provision, both in static spot ...
    • The investment horizon problem : a resolution 

      Aase, Knut K. (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2009-09)
      In the canonical model of investments, the optimal fractions in the risky assets do not depend on the time horizon. This is against empirical evidence, and against the typical recommendations of portfolio managers. We ...
    • Irreversible Investments Revisited 

      Sandal, Leif Kristoffer; Steinshamn, Stein Ivar (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2006-07)
      A non-linear dynamic model in two state variables, two controls and three cost terms is presented for the purpose of finding the optimal combination of exploitation and capital investment in optimal renewable resource ...