• Condorcet methods - when, why and how? 

      Stensholt, Eivind (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2008)
      Geometric representations of 3-candidate profiles are used to investigate properties of preferential election methods. The representation visualizes both the possibility to win by agenda manipulation, i.e. introducing a ...
    • Gibbard-Satterthwaite and an Arrovian Connection 

      Stensholt, Eivind (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2008-06)
      A very close link of G-S, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem to Arrow’s "impossibility" theorem is shown. G-S is derived as a corollary: from a strategy-proof singleseat election method F is constructed an election method ...
    • Voces populi and the art of listening 

      Stensholt, Eivind (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2008-06)
      The strategy most damaging to many preferential election methods is to give insincerely low rank to the main opponent of one’s favorite candidate. Theorem 1 determines the 3-candidate Condorcet method that minimizes the ...