Equilibrium, evolutionary stability and gradient dynamics

dc.contributor.author	Flåm, Sjur Didrik
dc.date.accessioned	2006-07-13T10:36:11Z
dc.date.available	2006-07-13T10:36:11Z
dc.date.issued	2002
dc.identifier.issn	1500-4066
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163697
dc.description.abstract	Considered here are equilibria, notably those that solve noncooperative games. Focus is on connections between evolutionary stability, concavity and monotonicity. It is shown that evolutionary stable points are local attractors under gradient dynamics. Such dynamics, while reflecting search for individual improvement, can incorporate myopia, imperfect knowledge and bounded rationality/competence.	en
dc.format.extent	255776 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng	en
dc.publisher	Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Science	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Discussion paper	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2002:6	en
dc.subject	equilibrium problems	en
dc.subject	noncooperative games	en
dc.subject	evolutionary and asymptotic stability	en
dc.subject	gradient dynamics	en
dc.subject	concavity	en
dc.subject	monotonicity	en
dc.title	Equilibrium, evolutionary stability and gradient dynamics	en
dc.type	Working paper	en