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dc.contributor.authorKvaløy, Ola
dc.date.accessioned2006-07-13T08:48:43Z
dc.date.available2006-07-13T08:48:43Z
dc.date.issued2003-09
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163765
dc.description.abstractAsset specificity is usually considered to be an argument for vertical integration. The main idea is that specificity induces opportunistic behaviour, and that vertical integration reduces this problem of opportunism. In this article I show that asset specificity actually can be an argument for non-integration. In a repeated game model of relational contracts, based on Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002, I show that asset specificity affects the temptation to renege on relational contracts between non-integrated parties, but not between integrated parties. If the parties are non-integrated, higher levels of specificity can provide relational contracts with higher-powered incentives.en
dc.format.extent103441 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Scienceen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2003:7en
dc.titleAsset specificity and vertical integrationen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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