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dc.contributor.authorOlsen, Trond E.
dc.contributor.authorOsmundsen, Petter
dc.date.accessioned2006-07-14T07:49:14Z
dc.date.available2006-07-14T07:49:14Z
dc.date.issued1999-11
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163807
dc.description.abstractTwo jurisdictions compete to capture the rents of a large multinational enterprise (MNE) which invests locally and which is partly owned by local investors. The MNE contributes to local welfare by tax payments and dividends, and it has private information about the efficiency of the operations in the two localizations. It is shown that the distortions in the MNE's real investment portfolio are determined by a trade-off between fiscal externalities and equity externalities, and that investments in the case of strategic tax competition may be lower than in the co-operative case. Ownership matters, and we show how the firm may reduce its overall tax payments by influencing the distribution of owner shares between investors in the two countries.en
dc.format.extent309112 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Scienceen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2000:2en
dc.subjecttax competitionen
dc.subjectmobilityen
dc.subjectcommon agencyen
dc.titleStrategic tax competition : implications of national ownershipen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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