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dc.contributor.authorSchindler, Dirk
dc.contributor.authorSchjelderup, Guttorm
dc.date.accessioned2007-06-20T11:38:39Z
dc.date.available2007-06-20T11:38:39Z
dc.date.issued2007-01
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/163883
dc.description.abstractWe study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society’s point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Finance and Management Scienceen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2007:8en
dc.subjectcorporate tax systemsen
dc.subjecttacit collusionen
dc.titleHarmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and its Effect on Collusive Behavioren
dc.typeWorking paperen
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Bedriftsøkonomi: 213en


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