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dc.contributor.authorSandal, Leif Kristoffer
dc.contributor.authorUbøe, Jan
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-12T12:34:14Z
dc.date.available2013-03-12T12:34:14Z
dc.date.issued2012-02
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/164187
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we consider Stackelberg games in a multiperiod vertical contracting model with uncertain demand. Demand has a distribution with a mean and variance that depend on the current retail price, and this dependence may vary from period to period. We focus on a class of problems in which the market has a memory-based scaling of demand, and the mean scaling is a function of previous retail prices. This leads to a strategic game in which the parties must balance high immediate profits with reduced future earnings. We propose a complete solution to this multiperiod Stackelberg game, covering cases with finite and infinite horizons. The theory is illustrated by using a Cobb-Douglas demand function with an additive, normally distributed random term, but the theory applies to more general settings.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics. Department of Finance and Management Scienceno_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper;2012:2
dc.subjectStackelberg gameno_NO
dc.subjectmultiperiod vertical contracting modelno_NO
dc.subjectprice-dependent demandno_NO
dc.titleStackelberg equilibria in a multiperiod vertical contracting model with uncertain and price-dependent demandno_NO
dc.typeWorking paperno_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Business: 213no_NO


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