Rent Sharing with Footloose Production. Foreign Ownership and Wages Revisited

dc.contributor.author	Balsvik, Ragnhild
dc.contributor.author	Sæthre, Morten
dc.date.accessioned	2014-10-01T09:48:24Z
dc.date.available	2014-10-01T09:48:24Z
dc.date.issued	2014-09
dc.identifier.issn	0804-6824
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11250/222551
dc.description.abstract	We present a bargaining model of wage and employment determina- tion, where we show that foreign acquisitions might hurt the bargaining outcome of powerful unions by giving the firm a credible threat to move production abroad. Using detailed data on firms and workers in manufac- turing, including information on union membership and foreign ownership, we find, in line with the predictions of our model, that foreign acquisitions negatively impact the outcome of workers in highly unionized plants.	nb_NO
dc.language.iso	eng	nb_NO
dc.publisher	SAM	nb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Discussion paper;30/14
dc.title	Rent Sharing with Footloose Production. Foreign Ownership and Wages Revisited	nb_NO
dc.type	Working paper	nb_NO
dc.subject.nsi	VDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212	nb_NO