|dc.description.abstract||My thesis discusses the effects on legal streaming agents of entry of free, but illegal, substitutes,
in a two–sided video streaming market. Legal streaming agents rely on support from two very
different, but inevitably linked, groups: studios and consumers, while their free counterparts rely
on support only from consumers. As a result, the pricing decisions for legal streaming agents
are far more complex than those of firms operating in regular single–sided markets and of firms
operating in other two–sided markets.
I have used one model, with two setups, in order to examine how the payment–scheme between a
paid streaming agent and the Studios affect key metrics as user distribution and platform utility.
In the first setup, with a lump–sum transfer, I find that the effectiveness of anti–piracy investments
increase utility for both the paid and the free platforms, and shift consumers towards the legal
alternative. In the second setup, with a per–user transfer, I find that the free agent will capture
the whole market, and no efforts taken by either the Studios or the paid streaming agent will
change the user distribution. From this, I find that studios and paid streaming agents are much
better off with lump–sum transfer.||nb_NO