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dc.contributor.authorBjørndal, Endre
dc.contributor.authorBjørndal, Mette
dc.contributor.authorRud, Linda
dc.contributor.authorRahimi Alangi, Somayeh
dc.date.accessioned2017-11-07T10:50:12Z
dc.date.available2017-11-07T10:50:12Z
dc.date.issued2017-11-07
dc.identifier.issn1500-4066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2464570
dc.description.abstractContrary to the common thought that nodal pricing provides more opportunities for a strategic player to exert market power than the zonal model, we show that in the latter one because of the need for re-dispatch or counter-trading, another extra place is created letting more gaming possibilities. Therefore, if proper market power mitigation approaches are not utilized in both day-ahead and re-dispatch markets, then zonal pricing may be more susceptible to market power, especially in zonal model which is based on available transfer capacity (ATC), strategic player's profit and social welfare can be very volatile. In general, the more network constraints are incorporated in day-ahead market (100% in nodal and almost zero in ATC), the more social welfare is attainable. Hence, nodal model is acquitted from the more market power denunciation.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherFORnb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper;14/17
dc.subjectMarket designnb_NO
dc.subjectcongestion managementnb_NO
dc.subjectavailable transfer capacity (ATC)nb_NO
dc.subjectmarket powernb_NO
dc.subjectexibility cost of re-dispatch or counter-tradingnb_NO
dc.titleMarket Power Under Nodal and Zonal Congestion Management Techniquesnb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber17nb_NO


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