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dc.contributor.authorAtal, Juan Pablo
dc.contributor.authorCuesta, José Ignacio
dc.contributor.authorSæthre, Morten
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-05T13:06:31Z
dc.date.available2018-10-05T13:06:31Z
dc.date.issued2018-09
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2566705
dc.description.abstractWe study the effects of quality regulation on market outcomes by exploiting the staggered phase-in of bioequivalence requirements for generic drugs in Chile. We estimate that the number of drugs in the market decreased by 25%, average paid prices increased by 10%, and total sales decreased by 20%. These adverse effects were concentrated among small markets. Our results suggest that the intended effects of quality regulation on price competition through increased (perceived) quality of generics—and therefore reduced vertical differentiation—were overturned by adverse competitive effects arising from the costs of complying with the regulation.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherInstitutt for samfunnsøkonomi, NHHnb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDP SAM;20/2018
dc.subjectQuality regulation, competition, bioequivalence, generic pharmaceuticalsnb_NO
dc.titleQuality Regulation and Competition: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Marketsnb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200nb_NO


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