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dc.contributor.authorAndersson, Jonas
dc.contributor.authorSchroyen, Fred
dc.contributor.authorTorsvik, Gaute
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-03T07:57:34Z
dc.date.available2019-10-03T07:57:34Z
dc.date.issued2019-09
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2619961
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we develop a model for tax amnesty applications in a multi-period setting. One key insight from the model is that applying for amnesty becomes more attractive at the moment when stricter enforcement is announced, even if the implementation of the policy is in the distant future. We use our model to make sense of how international tax information exchange agreements affects voluntary disclosure of wealth and income previously hidden in tax havens. Our data is from Norway. In accordance with the dynamic amnesty model we observe a strong announcement effect of a tax information exchange agreement between Norway and Switzerland and Luxembourg, the two most important tax havens for Norwegian tax evaders. However, the effect levels off very quickly, much faster than our model predicts. We think this is because the initial announcement of the tax agreement exaggerated the risk the agreement imposed to those who had hidden taxable income and wealth in Switzerland. We also estimate and find significant effects of the press releases the Norwegian Tax Authority issues to inform taxpayers about new international tax agreements and the amnesty, or voluntary disclosure, option that exists in the Norwegian tax code.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDP SAM;16/2019
dc.subjectTax Evasion, Tax Amnesty, Tax Information Exchange Agreementnb_NO
dc.titleThe impact of international tax information exchange agreements on the use of tax amnesty: evidence from Norwaynb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.subject.nsiSamfunnsvitenskapnb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber37nb_NO


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