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Transaction Cost Economics, Firm Power, and Negotiation Strategies: An Empirical Study of Buyer-Supplier Relationships in the Oil and Gas Industry

Moadmuang, Nasun
Doctoral thesis
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~ 14_02097-4 20141007 0928 PhD Thesis Nasun Moadmuang 227077_2_1.pdf (13.24Mb)
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/11250/2643759
Date
2014-12
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  • Doctoral Dissertations (SOL) [76]
Abstract
There are two main research purposes in this dissertation.

First, it aims to refine transaction cost economics (TCE) by including the scope condition of

power structure in the TCE framework. This study develops a model based on TCE and interfirm

power theory. It proposes that power structuremoderates the effect of specific investments

on governance modes.

Second, this study investigates the interplay of governance modes and negotiation strategies.

Building on TCE and negotiation theory, the study proposes that the interaction between

governance modes and negotiation strategies influences the performance of relationship.

The hypotheses were empirically tested on a sample of 198 inter-firm relationships in the

Norwegian oil and gas industry. Data were collected through a survey of oil and gas supplier

firms

With regard to the refinement of TCE, the results yielded mixed support for the hypotheses,

indicating that the TCE prediction does not work well for all types of firms. First, it works well

for firms with low power in asymmetric-power relationships. Second, it works better for firms

in asymmetric-power relationships than for firms in symmetric-power relationships. Third,

TCE works better for firms in no-interdependent relationships than for firms in mutualdependent

relationships.

With regard to the interplay of governance modes and negotiation strategies, the hypotheses

were partly supported. First, the results indicated that problem-solving negotiation strategy

enhances the positive effect of centralization on end-product enhancement outcomes. Second,

contrary to expectation, information exchange was found to hinder the positive effect of

problem-solving negotiation strategy on the same outcomes.

The findings indicate that (a) power structure should be included in the TCE framework to

improve the prediction ability of TCE and (b) relationship performance can be explained by

the interplay of governance modes and negotiation strategies. One finding, however, raises a

new question: to what extent does the firm’s use of information exchange (various types of

information) have a negative moderating effect on the association between problem-solving

negotiation strategy and end-product enhancement outcomes?

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