• norsk
    • English
  • English 
    • norsk
    • English
  • Login
View Item 
  •   Home
  • Norges Handelshøyskole
  • Thesis
  • Master Thesis
  • View Item
  •   Home
  • Norges Handelshøyskole
  • Thesis
  • Master Thesis
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Comparison of a country’s corruption level and delays in ports : a study of the effects corruption has on delays in ports

Klausen, Kristoffer Sanden; Ashourlou, Daniel Nima
Master thesis
Thumbnail
View/Open
masterthesis.pdf (917.6Kb)
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/11250/2645275
Date
2019
Metadata
Show full item record
Collections
  • Master Thesis [3749]
Abstract
The second-best theory of corruption includes predictions that corruption may be introduced

as a second-best option in dealing with burdensome bureaucracy, leading to more efficiency.

One of the predictions in the theory postulates that on average, paying for a better position in

a queue (bribes) should be negatively correlated with time delays, meaning that paying bribes

would reduce waiting time in a queue. Further, the theory on corruption predicts that the

relationship between paying bribes and time delays should vary across companies, with those

companies having the highest opportunity cost of waiting as well as lower costs of corruption

being more willing to pay for a better position in the queue, and thereby shortening the waiting

times.

This master’s thesis examines the relationship between bribes and waiting times in ports and

investigate the heterogeneity across firms depending on their home country’s corruption level.

Our data are inconsistent with the prediction that corruption shortens waiting times. According

to the specifications in this master’s thesis, all else equal, companies paying bribes in ports

experience longer waiting times when exporting and/or importing. Further, our specifications

indicate that the level of corruption in a company’s home country is in fact associated with

shorter waiting times. The results in this master’s thesis are at odds with the second-best theory

but do produce evidence that paying companies from more corrupt countries wait less than

paying companies from less corrupt countries. This implies that companies from more corrupt

home countries may possess a competitive advantage over companies from less corrupt home

countries when encountering corruption in ports.

Key words: International trade, Corruption, Time delays.

Contact Us | Send Feedback

Privacy policy
DSpace software copyright © 2002-2019  DuraSpace

Service from  Unit
 

 

Browse

ArchiveCommunities & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsDocument TypesJournalsThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsDocument TypesJournals

My Account

Login

Statistics

View Usage Statistics

Contact Us | Send Feedback

Privacy policy
DSpace software copyright © 2002-2019  DuraSpace

Service from  Unit