|dc.description.abstract||The second-best theory of corruption includes predictions that corruption may be introduced
as a second-best option in dealing with burdensome bureaucracy, leading to more efficiency.
One of the predictions in the theory postulates that on average, paying for a better position in
a queue (bribes) should be negatively correlated with time delays, meaning that paying bribes
would reduce waiting time in a queue. Further, the theory on corruption predicts that the
relationship between paying bribes and time delays should vary across companies, with those
companies having the highest opportunity cost of waiting as well as lower costs of corruption
being more willing to pay for a better position in the queue, and thereby shortening the waiting
This master’s thesis examines the relationship between bribes and waiting times in ports and
investigate the heterogeneity across firms depending on their home country’s corruption level.
Our data are inconsistent with the prediction that corruption shortens waiting times. According
to the specifications in this master’s thesis, all else equal, companies paying bribes in ports
experience longer waiting times when exporting and/or importing. Further, our specifications
indicate that the level of corruption in a company’s home country is in fact associated with
shorter waiting times. The results in this master’s thesis are at odds with the second-best theory
but do produce evidence that paying companies from more corrupt countries wait less than
paying companies from less corrupt countries. This implies that companies from more corrupt
home countries may possess a competitive advantage over companies from less corrupt home
countries when encountering corruption in ports.
Key words: International trade, Corruption, Time delays.||en_US