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dc.contributor.authorUlsaker, Simen A.
dc.date.accessioned2020-04-27T12:05:28Z
dc.date.available2020-04-27T12:05:28Z
dc.date.issued2020-06
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2652633
dc.description.abstractThe article considers a situation where several firms have the opportunity to sell an identical product to a set of buyers, and where each seller can invest in R&D to develop a higher quality version of the product in question. I consider the possibility of allowing the sellers to offer exclusionary contracts, prior to deciding how much to invest in R&D. In equilibrium every buyer will sign an exclusionary contract with the same seller. Since all buyers are locked to one seller, only this seller will have an incentive to invest in R&D. Whether or not banning exclusionary contracts increases the aggregate probability of successful innovation depends on the R&D technology. More specifically, banning exclusionary contracts will increase the aggregate probability of innovation and joint surplus of buyers and sellers only when the R&D technology exhibits sufficient diseconomies of scale.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDP SAM;05/2020
dc.titleExclusionary contracts and incentives to innovateen_US
dc.typeWorking paperen_US
dc.subject.nsiSamfunnsvitenskapen_US
dc.source.pagenumber23en_US


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