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Quota Enforcement and Capital Investment in Natural Resource Industries

Lazkano, Itziar; Nøstbakken, Linda
Working paper
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URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/297979
Date
2015-08
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  • Discussion papers (SAM) [579]
Abstract
We investigate the relationship between quota enforcement, compliance, and capital

accumulation in ITQ regulated fisheries. Over-extraction and over-capacity represent

two of the main fisheries management challenges, and we aim to model and analyze the

two jointly. In a stylized resource model, quota violating and complying firms invest

in capital, buy quotas, and choose their harvest. We show that in the short run, more

capacity increases illegal extraction, while a well-functioning quota market partially

alleviates this effect. We also show how tougher enforcement yields a double benefit

by directly improving compliance, and by indirectly reducing incentives to invest in

capacity, which improves future compliance. Our analysis thus contributes to the

literature on market-based management of renewable resources.
Publisher
SAM
Series
Discussion paper;21/15

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