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dc.contributor.authorGresik, Thomas A.
dc.contributor.authorSchjelderup, Guttorm
dc.date.accessioned2022-02-22T09:26:18Z
dc.date.available2022-02-22T09:26:18Z
dc.date.issued2022-02-22
dc.identifier.issn2387-3000
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2980713
dc.description.abstractThe view that the transfer pricing problem vanishes under universal destination-based cash flow taxation (DBCFT) is based on how firms behave in perfectly competitive markets. We show that the neutralizing effect DBCFT has on transfer price incentives fails once multinational firms are multi-market oligopolists. Under imperfect competition, a multinational will delegate output decisions to its affiliates. The transfer price then takes on a strategic role because it influences competitors’ actions. Even if all countries adopt DBCFT, transfer prices will not equal arm’s length prices, and the global efficiency implications attributed to DBCFT are lost.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFORen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper;8/22
dc.subjectDestination-based cash-flow taxen_US
dc.subjecttransfer pricingen_US
dc.subjectmanagerial delegationen_US
dc.titleTax induced transfer pricing under universal adoption of the destination-based cash-flow taxen_US
dc.typeWorking paperen_US
dc.source.pagenumber20en_US


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