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dc.contributor.authorAlstadsæter, Annette
dc.contributor.authorCasi, Elisa
dc.contributor.authorMiethe, Jakob
dc.contributor.authorStage, Barbara M. B.
dc.date.accessioned2023-11-13T09:58:15Z
dc.date.available2023-11-13T09:58:15Z
dc.date.issued2023-11-13
dc.identifier.issn2387-3000
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/3102121
dc.description.abstractIn unparalleled international coordination, more than 100 countries adopted the Common Reporting Standard (CRS), committing to automatically exchange information on citizens’ foreign financial assets. We study how heterogeneity in national CRS implementation shapes its effectiveness. Using data on cross-border bank transfers to Norway with unparalleled detail on hidden ownership structures, we find that cash repatriation from tax havens increases significantly post-CRS, but only from countries with vigorous enforcement. Relying on global data on cross-border bank deposits, we show that highly digitized tax administrations trigger twice the drop in tax haven deposits in response to the CRS.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFORen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper;22/23
dc.subjectGlobal Tax Agreementsen_US
dc.subjectTax Evasionen_US
dc.subjectFinancial Flowsen_US
dc.subjectTax Enforcementen_US
dc.titleLost in Information: National Implementation of Global Tax Agreementsen_US
dc.typeWorking paperen_US
dc.source.pagenumber47en_US


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