Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorBreitmoser, Yves
dc.contributor.authorValasek, Justin
dc.date.accessioned2023-11-22T07:49:35Z
dc.date.available2023-11-22T07:49:35Z
dc.date.issued2023-11-21
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/3103980
dc.description.abstractWe report on the results of an experiment designed to disentangle behavioral biases in information aggregation of committees. Subjects get private signals about the state of world, send binary messages, and finally vote under either majority or unanimity rules. Committee decisions are significantly more efficient than predicted by Bayesian equilibrium even with lying aversion. Messages are truthful, subjects correctly anticipate the truthfulness (contradicting limited depth of reasoning), but strikingly overestimate their pivotality when voting (contradicting plain lying aversion). That is, committees are efficient because members message truthfully and vote non-strategically. We show that all facets of behavior are predicted by overreaction, subjects overshooting in Bayesian updating, which implies that subjects exaggerate the importance of truthful messages and sincere voting. A simple one-parameteric generalization of quantal response equilibrium capturing overreaction covers 87 percent of observed noise.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherInstitutt for samfunnsøkonomien_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDP SAM;18/2023
dc.subjectcommitteesen_US
dc.subjectincomplete informationen_US
dc.subjectcheap talken_US
dc.subjectinformation aggregationen_US
dc.subjectlaboratory experimenten_US
dc.subjectBayesian updatingen_US
dc.subjectlying aversionen_US
dc.subjectlimited depth of reasoningen_US
dc.titleWhy do committees work?en_US
dc.typeWorking paperen_US
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200en_US
dc.source.pagenumber56en_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record