Blar i NHH Brage på emneord "incentives"

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    • Explicit and implicit incentives in fund management 

      Kristiansen, Eirik Gaard (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2001-01)
      Fund managers compete to attract new investors. Competition and fund management contracts provide implicit and explicit incentives for fund management. I study the combined effect of these two types of incentives on i) ...

    • Fiscal corruption : a vice or a virtue? 

      Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge; Tungodden, Bertil (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2002-07)
      Recent literature on tax administration in poor countries suggests there are virtues of allowing fiscal corruption. By strengthening the bargaining power of corrupt tax officers, it is argued that tax evasion may be ...

    • Investment in transmission 

      Førsund, Finn R. (Working paper, Working paper, 2007-11)
      Transmission is an integral part of the electricity system. However, even within a centralised system of generation and transmission it has never been a trivial exercise to perform coordination of expanding loads, generation ...

    • Long term care and hospital length of stay for elderly patients 

      Holmås, Tor Helge; Kjerstad, Egil; Kristiansen, Frode; Lurås, Hilde (Working paper, Working paper, 2007-04)
      The proportion of elderly people in the population is increasing and old patients’ bed occupancy rate in hospitals increases as a fraction of total bed occupancy. Because old patients, on average, are frailer than other ...

    • Quality incentives pay-off? 

      Strandenes, Siri Pettersen (Report, Research report, 2000-12)
      Intermediaries ascertain vessel quality in shipping markets. Thus, the classification societies set minimum quality requirements for trading vessels. Minimum class requirements do not differentiate between high quality and ...

    • Relational Contracts, Multiple Agents, and Correlated Outputs 

      Kvaløy, Ola; Olsen, Trond Egil (Journal article; Peer reviewed, 2019)
      We analyze relational contracts between a principal and a set of risk-neutral agents whose outputs are correlated. When only the agents’ aggregate output can be observed, a team incentive scheme is shown to be optimal, ...

    • Samaritan agents? : on the delegation of aid policy 

      Hagen, Rune Jansen (Working paper, Working paper, 2003-11)
      Should an aid donor delegate the responsibility for allocating its budget to an agent less averse to inequality than itself in order to alleviate the Samaritan's Dilemma it is facing? Despite the intuitive appeal of this ...

    • Samaritan agents? : on the delegation of aid policy 

      Hagen, Rune Jansen (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2003-12)
      Should an aid donor delegate the responsibility for allocating its budget to an agent less averse to inequality than itself in order to alleviate the Samaritan’s Dilemma it is facing? Despite the intuitive appeal of ...

    • Samaritan agents? : on the delegation of aid policy 

      Hagen, Rune Jansen (Discussion paper, Working paper, 2003)
      Should a donor delegate the responsibility for allocating its aid budget to a less inequality-averse agent to alleviate the consequences of the Samaritan’s Dilemma it is facing? I show that when aid impact differs across ...

    • The market in economics : behavioural assumptions and value judgments 

      Sandmo, Agnar (Discussion paper;12/2014, Working paper, 2014-04)
      This paper tries to convey the essence of the economic theory of behaviour of individuals and firms to an audience of non-economists. The hypotheses of utility and profit maximization and their use as building blocks in ...