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Samaritan agents? : on the delegation of aid policy

Hagen, Rune Jansen
Working paper
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http://hdl.handle.net/11250/162664
Issue date
2003-12
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  • Discussion papers (SAM) [553]
Abstract
Should an aid donor delegate the responsibility for allocating its budget

to an agent less averse to inequality than itself in order to alleviate

the Samaritan’s Dilemma it is facing? Despite the intuitive appeal of this

proposition, I show that the optimal type of agent depends on whether or

not committing to a greater share for recipients where the productivity

of aid is low is efficiency-enhancing. This is the case for donors not too

concerned with redistribution. They would therefore benefit from delegating

the determination of the discretionary allocation rule to agents more sensitive to distributional issues than themselves.
Publisher
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics
Series
Discussion paper
2003:22

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