dc.contributor.author | Hagen, Rune Jansen | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-08-04T08:58:52Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-08-04T08:58:52Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2003-12 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0804-6824 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/162664 | |
dc.description.abstract | Should an aid donor delegate the responsibility for allocating its budget
to an agent less averse to inequality than itself in order to alleviate
the Samaritan’s Dilemma it is facing? Despite the intuitive appeal of this
proposition, I show that the optimal type of agent depends on whether or
not committing to a greater share for recipients where the productivity
of aid is low is efficiency-enhancing. This is the case for donors not too
concerned with redistribution. They would therefore benefit from delegating
the determination of the discretionary allocation rule to agents more sensitive to distributional issues than themselves. | en |
dc.format.extent | 280506 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion paper | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2003:22 | en |
dc.subject | foreign aid | en |
dc.subject | incentives | en |
dc.subject | strategic delegation | en |
dc.title | Samaritan agents? : on the delegation of aid policy | en |
dc.type | Working paper | en |