Centralized vs. de-centralized multinationals and taxes

dc.contributor.author	Nielsen, Søren Bo
dc.contributor.author	Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis
dc.contributor.author	Schjelderup, Guttorm
dc.date.accessioned	2006-07-10T11:45:46Z
dc.date.available	2006-07-10T11:45:46Z
dc.date.issued	2005-03
dc.identifier.issn	0804-6824
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11250/162692
dc.description.abstract	The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise’s choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs — here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument —, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large.	en
dc.format.extent	190647 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng	en
dc.publisher	Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Discussion paper	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2005:11	en
dc.subject	centralized vs. de-centralized decisions	en
dc.subject	taxes	en
dc.subject	MNEs	en
dc.title	Centralized vs. de-centralized multinationals and taxes	en
dc.type	Working paper	en