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dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarle
dc.contributor.authorMidelfart, Karen Helene
dc.contributor.authorSchjelderup, Guttorm
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-03T07:56:32Z
dc.date.available2006-08-03T07:56:32Z
dc.date.issued2004-07
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/162814
dc.description.abstractMultinational firms are known to shift profits and countries are known to compete over shifty profits. Two major principles for corporate taxation are Separate Accounting (SA) and Formula Apportionment (FA). These two principles have very different qualities when it comes to preventing profit shifting and preserving national tax autonomy. Most OECD countries use SA. In this paper we show that a reduction in trade barriers lowers equilibrium corporate taxes under SA, but leads to higher taxes under FA. From a welfare point of view the choice of tax principle is shown to depend on the degree of economic integration.en
dc.format.extent223186 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2004:18en
dc.subjectmultinational enterprisesen
dc.subjecteconomic integrationen
dc.subjecttrade costsen
dc.subjectinternational tax competitionen
dc.subjecttax regimesen
dc.titleCorporate tax systems, multinational enterprises, and economic integrationen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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