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dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarle
dc.contributor.authorMidelfart, Karen Helene
dc.contributor.authorSchjelderup, Guttorm
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-08T07:28:56Z
dc.date.available2006-08-08T07:28:56Z
dc.date.issued2003-05
dc.identifier.issn0804-6824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/162862
dc.description.abstractAlmost all the literature on tax competition in the presence of multinationals (MNCs) ignores the combined effect of profit shifting and economic integration (i.e., a reduction in trade costs) on equilibrium capital taxes. In this paper we set up a two-country model with trade costs to analyze the relationship between economic integration and equilibrium taxes. We find that economic integration leads to higher equilibrium tax rates for sufficiently low levels of trade costs if multinationals are owned by home country residents.en
dc.format.extent131411 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherNorwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries2003:5en
dc.titleWhy corporate taxes may rise : the case of economic integrationen
dc.typeWorking paperen


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