Taxation and tournaments

dc.contributor.author	Sandmo, Agnar
dc.contributor.author	Persson, Mats
dc.date.accessioned	2006-08-10T10:45:27Z
dc.date.available	2006-08-10T10:45:27Z
dc.date.issued	2002-05
dc.identifier.issn	0804-6824
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11250/162898
dc.description.abstract	This paper analyzes the effects of progressive taxes on labour supply and income distribution in the context of the rank-order tournament model originally developed by Lazear and Rosen (1981). We show conditions under which a more progressive tax schedule will cause so large general equilibrium effects that the inequality in disposable income will actually increase. We also show that a non-zero redistributive tax is always optimal if society’s welfare function displays inequality aversion; this result always holds, regardless of behavioral responses and general equilibrium effects.	en
dc.format.extent	66170 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng	en
dc.publisher	Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Department of Economics	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Discussion paper	en
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2002:10	en
dc.title	Taxation and tournaments	en
dc.type	Working paper	en